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Abstract
The economic and nancial crisis of 2008 caused a deep crisis characterized by
a weak potential growth and a persistent output gap. In this paper, we propose
a model to explain the crisis and its persistence by a regime switching from a full
employment equilibrium to an underemployment equilibrium. In the latter, the real
equilibrium interest rate is negative and the economy is in deation. Monetary
policy targeting ination becomes inactive due to a non-negativity constraint in the
policy rate (zero lower bound). This secular stagnation equilibrium is achieved by
introducing, in a standard overlapping generations model, two market imperfections:
a credit rationing and a downward nominal wage rigidity. To exit from the secular
stagnation trap, we study the impact of various economic policies. An increase in
the ination target (more accommodating monetary policy) is e¤ective if the central
bank is credible enough. A scal policy, by supporting aggregate demand, can help
the economy to exit from the secular stagnation trap. But such a policy reduces
the full employment potential regime due to less incentive to accumulate capital.
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1 Introduction
The economic state of slow growth and underemployment, coupled with low ination
or even deation, has recently been widely discussed, in particular by Larry Summers
(2014), under the label of secular stagnation. The hypothesis of secular stagnation was
expressed for the rst time in 1938 in a speech by A. Hansen, which was nally published
in 1939. Hansen was worried about insu¢ cient investment and a declining population in
the United States, following a long period of strong economic and demographic growth.
A state of secular stagnation results when an abundance of savings relative to demand
for credit pushes the naturalreal interest rate (what is compatible with full employment)
below zero. But if the real interest rate permanently remains above the natural rate, then
the result is a chronic shortage of aggregate demand and investment, with a weakened
growth potential.
To counter secular stagnation, the monetary authorities rst reduced their policy rates,
and then, having reached the zero lower bound (ZLB), they implemented non-conventional
policies called quantitative easing. The central banks cannot really force interest rates
to be very negative, otherwise private agents would have an interest in keeping their
savings in the form of banknotes. Beyond quantitative easing, what other policies might
potentially help pull the economy out of secular stagnation?
To answer this crucial question, the model developed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra
in 2014 has the great merit of clarifying the mechanisms behind a fall into long-term
stagnation, and it is helping macroeconomic analysis to update its understanding of the
multiplicity of equilibria and the persistence of the crisis. Their model is based on the
consumption and savings behaviour of agents with a nite lifespan in a context of a
rationed credit market and nominal wage rigidity. As for the monetary policy conducted
by the central bank, this is set at a nominal rate using a Taylor rule.
According to this approach, secular stagnation was initiated by the 2008 economic
and nancial crisis. This crisis was linked to high household debt, which ultimately led
to credit rationing. In this context, credit rationing leads to a fall in demand and excess
savings. Consequently, the real interest rate falls. In a situation of full employment,
if credit tightens sharply, the equilibrium interest rate becomes negative, which leaves
conventional monetary policy toothless. In this case, the economy plunges into a lasting
state of underemployment of labour, characterised by output that is below potential and
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by deation.
In the model proposed by Eggertsson and Mehrotra, there is no capital accumulation.
As a result, the underlying dynamic is characterized by adjustments without transition
from one steady state to another (from full employment to secular stagnation if theres a
credit crisis, and vice versa if credit doesnt tighten much).
To extend the analysis, we considered the accumulation of physical capital as a prereq-
uisite to any productive activity. This highlights an asymmetry in the dynamics of secular
stagnation. If the credit constraint is loosened, then capital converges on its pre-crisis
level. However, exiting the crisis takes longer than entering it. This property suggests
that economic policies used to ght against secular stagnation must be undertaken as
soon as possible.
There are several lessons o¤ered by this approach.
To avoid the ZLB, there is an urgent need to create ination while avoiding speculative
asset bubbles, which could require special regulation. The existence of a deationary
equilibrium thus raises the question of the appropriateness of monetary policy rules that
are overly focused on ination.
One should be wary of the deationary e¤ects of policies to boost potential output.
The right policy mix is to support structural policies with a su¢ ciently accommodative
monetary policy.
Cutting savings to raise the real interest rate (e.g. by facilitating debt) is an interesting
possibility, but the negative impact on potential GDP should not be overlooked. There
is a clear trade-o¤ between exiting secular stagnation and depressing potential GDP.
The article consists of four parts. In the second section, we develop an overlapping
generations model. This model makes the heart of the process of economic growth of
productive capital accumulation. We introduce imperfections on the credit market (ra-
tioning) and the labor market (wage rigidity). In addition, we assume that the central
bank conducts monetary policy to control ination thanks to the setting of a nominal
policy interest rates via a Taylor rule, knowing that the nominal rate can not be negative.
In section 3, we characterize the economic dynamics (dynamic time paths and steady
states) and the secular stagnation equilibrium. There are three congurations. If the
long-run equilibrium is unique, there are two cases: full employment with ination target
or secular stagnation with underemployment and deation. In both cases, the equilibria
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are globally determined with dynamics characterized by a unique saddle path. Finally,
in a third conguration, the two preceding equilibria coexist with a third equilibrium of
full employment and missed ination target. This equilibrium is undetermined and the
other two are determined. These determined steady states are not unique. Therefore,
they are only locally determined, not globally. Section 4 discusses the economic policy
issues (monetary, scal and structural) to exit the secular stagnation trap. Without going
into details, we show that an increase in the ination target can be helpful but only if
the central bank is credible enough, that increasing productivity or reducing rigidities can
be counterproductive contrary to suggests the standard approach developped in the rst
part and nally that any reduction of savings induces inationary pressure and can help
the economy out of secular stagnation. The last section concludes.
2 The model
The economy is composed of four types of agents: individuals, rms, a governement and
a central bank.
Following Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965), we assume that individuals live for
three periods: they are successively young, middle-aged-workers then retired. the number
of young individuals, Nt at date t, is growing at the constant rate n so that:
Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1 (1)
Competitive rms produce one good, which is both a consumption good and an in-
vestment good, by using two factors: labor and capital. The governement nances public
expenditures by taxing workers (with balanced budget), and the central bank determines
the nominal rate of interest to control ination.
Accordingly, there are four markets in the economy: good, labor, capital and credit.
2.1 Individuals and credit rationing
During their rst period of live, individuals borrow to invest in capital. We denote It 1 this
investment. One can think for example of human capital but for simplicity, we assume that
physical and human capital are perfect substitutes. A period later, the investment is sold
to rms with a return equal to Rkt . When they are active they o¤er inelasticly an amount
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of work l normalized to unity, l = 1, and work for a real wage rate wt. They consume ct
and save such that amt 1 is their real net asset, they also pay back their loans plus interest.
They also pay a lump-sum tax T . In the nal period of life, they consume dt+1. Assuming
that each individual works e¤ectively an identical duration lt  l, budgetary constraints
are as follows:
8>>><>>>:
ayt 1 =  It 1
ct + a
m
t = wtlt   T +Rkt It 1 +Rtayt 1
dt+1 = Rt+1a
m
t
(2)
where ayt denotes the net real asset at date t of a young individual and Rt the real interest
factor.
Note that for a pure question of analytical simplicity, we assume as usual in this type
of literature that individuals do not consume in the rst period of life (see for example
Boldrin and Montes, 2005, and Docquier et al., 2007). Furthermore, it is assumed that
there is no altruism, and so individuals start in life with zero assets. The preferences
of an individual born in period t   1 are therefore characterized by the following utility
function:
Ut 1 = log ct +  log dt+1 (3)
where  denotes the psychological discount factor. It is easily shown that the optimal
behavior of the consumer, obtained by utility maximization of eq. (3) under budgetary
constraints (2), yields the following optimal asset:
amt = s
 
wtlt   T +Rkt It 1 +Rtayt 1

(4)
where s = 
1+
denotes the saving rate.
An often preferred hypothesis to explain the economic and nancial crisis of 2008
is that of an imperfect nancial markets, and among them a household indebtedness
resulting ultimately in the crisis by rationing credit these same households. To translate
such a situation and study its ability to explain the crisis as part of a growth model,
we assume following Aiyagari (1994), Krugman and Eggertsson (2012) or Eggertsson and
Mehrotra (2014) that the credit market is rationed as1:
1Microeconomic theories of credit rationing are based mostly on the non-observability either of the
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 ayt 1 
D
Rt
(5)
Such a constraint does not focus on the loanable proportion, but on the ability households
will have the following period to repay their loans, i.e., to repay the capital borrowed plus
interest. If this constraint bites (of course it is assumed when Rkt > Rt), we then have
ayt 1 =   DRt .
2.2 Firms
From the production side, we assume that the good is produced in a competitive sec-
tor characterized by a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale such that
F (Kt; Nt 1lt) = AKt (Nt 1lt)
1 , where  < 1 and A denotes the total factor productiv-
ity (TFP). The prot maximization then yields:
wt = A (1  ) kt l t , lt  1 (6)
and
Rkt = Ak
 1
t l
1 
t + (1  ) (7)
where kt = KtNt 1 is the level of capital per worker and  the depreciation rate of capital,
 2 (0; 1].
2.3 Wage bargaining and nominal rigidity
Each generation of workers is negotiating a contract. We assume that at the beginning of
each period a wage negotiation denes the prole of nominal wages throughout the period
of activity. For simplicity, we dene Wt (0) and Wt (1) as the levels of nominal wages at
the beginning and at the end of period t. Assuming an aversion to the decline in nominal
wages during the period, the wage at the end of the period is determined according to:
Wt (1) = max

~Wt;W

t

(8)
individual e¤ort (moral hazard) or of skills (adverse selection) (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Aghion and
Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997). They all have in common to explain that a higher collateral allows to
borrow more.
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where W t = A (1  )Ptkt is the full employment wage rate and ~Wt = Wt (0) +
(1  )W t ,  2 (0; 1) characterizes the aversion to the decline in nominal wages or the
degree of downward rigidity of wages. Assuming that wage bargaining leads to setting a
constant level of real wage over the period, wt =
Wt(0)
Pt 1
= Wt(1)
Pt
, we then have:
wt = max
 
(1  )A (1  ) kt
1  
t
; wt
!
(9)
where wt is the full employment real wage rate. We observe straightforwardly that in
this conguration, if the economy is in deation, then the negotiated real wage level is
above its full employment level: wt =
(1 )(1 )kt
1  
t
 (1  ) kt if t  1. Indeed, in
case of deation, maintaining both purchasing power and full employment means lower
nominal wage. If the required drop is reduced, and especially as aversion to nominal wage
decline is strong, then the real wage becomes stronger than the one that would allow full
employment.
2.4 Central bank: Taylor rule and ination target
We assume that the monetary authorities want to control ination. Following Eggertsson
and Mehrotra (2014), we express the Taylor rule as:
1 + it = max
 
1; (1 + i)

t

!
(10)
where   1 denotes the o¢ cial ination target,  > 1. When 1 + it = (1 + i)
 
t

 ,
the Taylor rule will operate and, in this sense, we can say that monetary policy is active.
By contrast, when it = 0, the central bank is constrained by the nominal zero lower
bound. In this case, we say that monetary policy is inactive. According to the equation
(10), we can highlight a level of ination
kink = (1 + i
)
 1
  (11)
such that it  0 , t  kink. In addition, for the ination target to be reached in the
unconstrained regime we set 1 + i = Req. Such Taylor rule means that the central
bank pursues one goal: the ination target .
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2.5 Equilibrium with market imperfections
By assuming that the credit constraint is binding, i.e. Rkt > Rt, an equilibrium is dened
by clearings in the capital market
Nt 1kt = Nt 1It 1 (12)
and in the credit market
Nta
y
t +Nt 1a
m
t = 0 (13)
By contrast, knowing that wages are downardly rigid, the labor market does not neces-
sarily clear. From eqs. (6) and (9), it then yields:
lt = min (1;L (t)) (14)
where L (t) =

1  
t
1 
 1

with L0 = 
2

1  

1 
 1

 1
> 0: We then observe that the under-
employment of labor is particularly important that deation is strong.
3 Characteristics of the secular stagnation equilib-
rium
3.1 The supply-demand equilibrium of good and the dynamics
of capital
The supply of good per worker is obviously determined by:
yst = Ak

t min
 
1;L (t)1 

+ (1  ) kt (15)
From the constancy of scale returns, we immediately check that the demand per worker
is equal to ydt =
Yt
Nt 1
= wtlt + R
k
t kt. Knowing that at equilibrium kt = It 1 (eq. 12), we
deduce from the equation (4) that wtlt + Rkt kt =
1
s
amt   Rtayt 1 + T . Using equilibrium
relations (13) and (14), the dynamics of the population (1), the credit rationing (5) and
the public balanced budget G = T , where G denotes the public spendings by number of
workers at any date t, the aggregate demand per worker can be expressed as:
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ydt =
1 + n
s
It +D +G (16)
Typically, it increases with its two components that are the private investment and the
public demand. It also decreases with the saving rate s and increases with the population
growth rate n. The aggregate demand is also impacted through the credit constraint (5).
In particular, if D is lowered, consumption of the elderly is reduced so that dt = Rtamt 1 =
 Rt (1 + n) ayt 1 = (1 + n)D.
In the good market, the supply-demand equilibrium yst = y
d
t (with eq. 12) then
determines the following dynamics of the capital stock:
kt+1 =
1
1 + n
S (kt;t) (17)
where S (kt;t) = sAkt min
 
1; l (t)
1    D   G + (1  ) kt with S 0k = sRk > 0,
S 0 = sw(1+n)L0 > 0 if  < 1 and S 0 = 0 if   1:
If t  1, then the dynamics is kt+1 = 11+nS (kt; 1). In this case, it is easy to show that
if D +G is small enough, there exists a unique stable steady state with full employment
kFE for any k0 > kinst > 0, where the second steady state kinst is unstable. The dynamic
properties of the capital accumulation process can be characterized by studying kt+1 =
kt+1   kt. By denition at the steady state kFE, kt+1 = 0: Therefore, with decreasing
productivity, if kt > kFE then kt+1 < 0 and if kFE > kt > kinst then kt+1 < 0. Note
that this process is independent of ination and thus the curve k = 0 is vertical in the
plane (k;). If t < 1, then the dynamics is expressed as kt+1 = 11+nS (kt;t). When
the economy falls in deation, nominal rigidity of wages elimates the full employment
equilibrium. Thus, a decline in the amount of work will reduce the marginal product of
capital. In this case, the equilibrium level of capital will be reduced. The curve describing
the locus kt+1 = 0 is growing in the plane (k;) when  < 1 and sRkt < 1.
3.2 Taylor rule and stabilization of ination
According to the Fisher equation, we have:
Rt+1 = (1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
=
1 + it
t+1
(18)
Combining equations (10) and (18), we obtain:
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t+1 =
max

1; (1 + i)
 
t


Rt+1
(19)
Knowing that kt+1 = It = DRt+1 ; it yields from eq. (17) that:
1
Rt+1
=
S (kt;t)
(1 + n)D
: (20)
Including this result in equation (19), the dynamics of ination becomes:
t+1 =
S (kt;t)
(1 + n)D
max
 
1; (1 + i)

t

!
(21)
For clarity, suppose kink  1. In this case, if t  kink, then this equation becomes
t+1 =
s
(1+n)D
(1 + i)
 
t

 S (kt; 1) and we obtain:
t+1 = 0() t = 

(1 + n) kFE
S (kt; 1)
 1
 1
if t  kink (22)
We observe that when monetary policy is active (t  kink), then the stabilization of
ination requires that the level of ination decreases when the level of capital is high (or
the interest rate is low). To understand this conguration, rewrite the Fisher equation
as t+1 = 1+itRt+1 . Stabilizing ination t+1 = 0 is then equivalent to t =
1+it
Rt+1
, or after
log-linearization to d~t = d g1 + it   d ~Rt+1. According to equation (17), increasing the
level of capital in t yields more capital in t + 1 and then a lower interest rate in t + 1.
The stabilization of ination everything else being equal, i.e. with an unchanged nominal
interest rate d g1 + it = 0, requires then that the level of ination increases in t such that
d~t = d~t+1 =  d ~Rt+1 > 0 when d~kt > 0. However, an active monetary policy yields an
overreaction of the nominal interest rate such that d g1 + it = d~t where  > 1. Hence,
the initial e¤ect of an increase in the level of capital through a decrease in the interest
rate is reversed such that d~t = d~t+1 =
d ~Rt+1
 1 < 0 when d
~kt > 0. Accordingly, we can
verify that when monetary policy is inactive (t < kink) and the ination is positive
(t  1), this relationship is in the opposite direction. Indeed, in this case, t+1 = S(kt;1)(1+n)D
which allows us to dene:
t+1 = 0() t = S (kt; 1)
(1 + n)D
if 1  t  kink (23)
Finally, when monetary policy is active in the deationary area (t < 1  kink), we
have t+1 =
S(kt;t)
(1+n)D
and we obtain:
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t+1 = 0() t = S (kt;t)
(1 + n)D
if t < 1  kink (24)
Di¤erentiating this equation in the neighborhood of  = 1 yields

1  S0
(1+n)D

dt =
S0k
(1+n)D
dkt. As is obvious,  = 0 yields dtdkt > 0. Indeed, in this case there is no wage rigidity
and the curve is strictly similar to the previous one. By contrast, if the wage rigidity is
strong enough such that  > (1+n)D
(1+n)D+(1 )sAk=1 , the relation that links the level of capital
to ination in order to guarantee a stable level of ination is again decreasing. In that
case, the increase in the capital in t yields a su¢ ciently strong decrease in employment
(due to the gap between the e¤ective and the full employment real wage) such that the
product in t decreases. Therefore, savings in t decreases as well as the capital in t + 1
such that Rt+1 increases. In all of these congurations, it is easy to show that for any
given level of t,
@t+1
@kt
> 0.
Representing the curves k and  in the same phase plane (k;) can illustrate
three congurations. If the equilibrium is unique, there are two cases: full employment
with ination target (Fig. 1a) with (kFE;) the stable steady state or secular stagnation
with underemployment and deation (Fig. 1b) with (kSS;SS) the stable steady state.
In both cases, the equilibria are globally determined with dynamics characterized by a
unique saddle path. Finally, in a third conguration, the two preceding equilibria coexist
with a third equilibrium of full employment and missed ination target: (kind;ind). This
equilibrium is undetermined and the other two are determined. These determined steady
states are not unique. Therefore, they are only locally determined, not globally.
The question is that of the change from an dynamic time path to another, and in par-
ticular, which may explain the fall in secular stagnation starting from a full-employment
equilibrium. So we are naturally interested in the credit crunch as an eventual cause of
the crisis.
3.3 Credit crunch and secular stagnation
What happens if the constraint debt is tightened? Paradoxically, the capital stock of full
employment is decreasing with the constraint of debt. Indeed, from equation (17) and
assuming with no loss of generality that G = 0, it yields that in the neighborhood of
the saddle point steady state dened as kFE = s1+n s(1 ) (Ak

FE  D), the dynamics of
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Figure 1: Features of the steady states
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capital is as follows: dkt+1 = "dkt  s1+ndD, where " = s1+n
 
Ak 1FE + 1  

< 1. It then
yields dkFE
dD
=   s
1+n
1
1 " < 0. As kFE =
D
Req
, we deduce that at the steady state, dReq
Req
> dD
D
.
These results come from the fact that the supply of savings is inelastic w.r.t the interest
factor while the present value of the debt constraint (loan application) has an elasticity of
1 w.r.t the interest rate. A decrease in D automatically implies a decrease in the demand
for credit that can only be adjusted by lower interest rates. Consequently, households are
less indebted, increasing their future saving capacity and therefore the accumulation of
savings.
Finally, it can be shown that if D <

A
+ 1+n
s
 1
1 
, then at the steady state, we have
Req < 1, i.e. that the equilibrium interest rate (req = Req   1) becomes negative, which
can be problematic for monetary policy as outlined in the introduction. According to
the Fisher equation, we know that R = 1+i

, where i is the nominal interest rate and 
the ination factor. Following a savings glut in the economy, monetary policy can be
conducted toward the limit to zero and thereby induce a type of long-term stagnation in
employment equilibrium. The nominal wage rigidity combined with positivity constraint
of nominal policy interest rate is a key element to display a secular stagnation situation.
The following lemma gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of such
a equilibrium (Walrasian desequilibrium).
Lemma 1 A secular stagnation equilibrium exists and is locally determined i¤ Req <
1 () D <

A
+ 1+n
s
 1
1 
. If Req < 1 () kink > , then the secular stagnation
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2 All things being equal, any su¢ ciently large decrease in D can bring back
the economy in secular stagnation.
Figure 2 illustrates the fall in secular stagnation after a credit tightening at time t = 0.
Starting from a position of full employment (the capital level is normalized to unity), if the
credit crunch is su¢ ciently large, then the equilibrium interest rate is su¢ ciently negative
and the conventional monetary policy can no longer be conducted actively. In this case,
the secular stagnation is the unique equilibrium of the economy and the economy plunges
into recession with an underemployment of labor, thus associated with a production lower
than its potential level, and deation. The rst period of the shock, as the capital is
predetermined, it does not change, k0 = kFE. However, as soon as the second period it
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Secular Stagnation
reaches its steady state level of secular stagnation2, kt = kSS 8t  1. The fall into secular
stagnation is very fast. We also observe an overshooting of the level of deation just after
the shock. Indeed, as the level of capital already installed can not be adjusted initially,
there is an excessive supply which results in a higher deation: 0 < SS. Deation then
reaches its lower steady state level one period after the shock, t = SS 8t  1. Formally,
it can be shown from the dynamics (21) that SS =
S(kFE ;0)
(1+n)D
= S(kSS ;SS)
(1+n)D
. Therefore, as
S 0k > 0 and S 0 > 0 if  < 1, kFE > kSS yields 0 < SS (< 1). Note also that the secular
stagnation equilibrium, as in Eggertsson and Merhotra (2014), and unlike Krugman and
Eggertsson (2012), is persistant as long as the credit crunch lasts. From this point of
view, active policies against the credit crunch are crucial in the ght against the secular
stagnation.
Assume now such a policy is e¢ cient so that it had brought back condence in the
nancial markets. Whats going on if the credit constraint returns to its original position?
Of course we return to the initial situation where the only determined equilibrium is
characterized by full employment. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 3, capital returns
2The local dynamics is associated with an eigenvalue equal to zero (see Appendix).
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Figure 3: Dynamics of recovery
to its original level only after 7 periods. In other words, the fall into secular stagnation
appears signicantly faster than the recovery. This observation suggests that the economic
policies against the secular stagnation must be made within the shortest possible time,
preferably even before secular stagnation appears.
We observe again that the dynamics of ination is characterized by an overshooting.
However, in this case the monetary policy is active and an increase in  can mitigate
its importance. To see this, consider rst the autonomous dynamics of capital charac-
terized by kt+1 = 11+nS (kt;1) in the neighborhood of the full employment equilibrium:
kt+1 kFE
kFE
=  kt kFE
kFE
where  < 1. The stable manifold as illustrated in Fig. is then
characterized by the following equation t 

 =    
kt kFE
kFE
(see Appendix), where
lim
=1

  
 

= 0 () lim
=1
(t   ) = 0 8t. The characterization of the dynamics
of secular stagnation with capital accumulation is important not only to determine the
speed of converge towards the secular stagnation steady state and its dynamic features
(overshooting of deation for example), but also to highlight the asymmetry.
It is worth noting that the existence of a secular stagnation equilibrium is not due only
to the e¤ects of the nancial crisis. In particular, without going further into the details
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of the model, a decrease in the growth of the labor force (n decrease) and an increase in
the life expectancy (that can be associated with an increase in  then with an increase in
the saving rate s) also participate to explain the secular stagnation. According to Larry
Summers in 2013 in the Financial Times, the secular stagnation may well have become the
"new normal". In addition to the stabilization of nancial markets, any economic policy
that could be e¤ective in the ght against the secular stagnation must be considered. We
can think to monetary and scal policies, but also to structural policies designed to make
the labor market more exible.
4 Economic policy
As secular stagnation can exist only as wages are downwardly rigid, we can naturally
think that promoting growth and employment goes through increasing the exibility of
the labor market. However, in secular stagnation, it has a paradoxical impact as a decrease
in the wage rigidity  tends to reduce the production and the employment. One may be
surprised by this result. Indeed, when there is no rigidity, i.e.  = 0, the production
is always equal to its potential. However, this result can be easily explained. In secular
stagnation, a stronger nominal wage exibility results in recessionary e¤ects because it
generates deationary pressures, and therefore, as monetary policy is constrained by the
ZLB, an increase in the real interest rate
 
R = 1


. The demand, and then the e¤ective
production, are reduced at equilibrium. Paradoxically, a higher nominal wage exibility
yields an increase in the real wage. Increasing the labor market exibility, unless it
becomes total, has then conterproductive e¤ects for the economy. Monetay and scal
policies must then be considered in details.
4.1 Monetary policy
Suppose that the economy is characterized by a unique deationary secular stagnation
equilibrium as shown in Figure 1b (kink > ). To get out of such a equilibrium, the
monetary authorities can choose a policy consisting in increasing the ination target .
In this case, we see that this increase in the ination target also increases kink but less
than proportionately:
dkink
kink
d

= 1  1

< 1. Starting from a situation characterized by kink
kink > 
, two congurations can then happen. Firstly, the increase of  is not su¢ cient
16
and thus kink kink remains below . In this case, the secular stagnation equilibrium
is unique and the unchanged monetary policy is ine¤ective. Secondly, the upward of 
is su¢ cient such that  becomes greater than kink. In this case, as shown in Figure
4, the full employment equilibrium appears. This does not mean that monetary policy
will necessarily be e¤ective. It is observed in fact that the secular stagnation balance
still exists. Therefore, nothing indicates that ination expectations will automatically
jump on the high saddle path converging to . It should be emphasized two propertie.
Firstly, the secular stagnation equilibrium is locally determined. Secondly, an innity of
other ination levels  2 (ss;sup) bring on potentially convergent trajectories towards
ind < 
, where (kFE;ind) is a locally stable equilibrium3. From this point of view, in
line with Benhabib et al. (2001), we can consider that the Taylor rule involves a risk of
destabilization even though its primary ambition is stabilizing.
In such a conguration, the anchoring of ination expectations of private agents to
conduct towards the right equilibrium is a di¢ cult task for monetary authorities. For
ination targeting to be e¤ective, it is crucial in particular that the central bank be
credible enough (Woodford, 2004). While private agents do not believe the central bank
when it announces a new ination target, it is likely that ination obtained is not equal
to the target. The credibility of the central bank is then directly related to its ability to
achieve its target in the past. In secular stagnation, the central bank can not by denition
carried out target (monetary policy is inactive). Such property suggests that central bank
has to react quickly enough to avoid deationary trap.
4.2 Fiscal policy
It is easy to see that a scal policy will have inationary e¤ects and if they are strong
enough they can a¤ord to exit from secular stagnation. However, it is worth noting that
such a policy will harm the long-term potential (proposition 3).
Proposition 3 The scal policy reduces the level of capital associated with full employ-
ment: dkFE
dG
< 0.
3In the appendix, we check that the normal equilibrium is associated locally to a higher eigenvalue
to the unit and a lower eigenvalue, while the second balance is associated with two lower eigenvalues to
unity.
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Figure 4: Secular stagnation, monetary policy and global indeterminacy
Proposition 4 There exist Gsup = AD 
 
1+n
s
+ 

D and Ginf = A (D) 1+n s(1 )s D,
Gsup  Ginf , such that:
 G < Ginf yields that the secular stagnation equilibrium is unique and then globally
determined,
 G > Gsup yields that the full employment equilibrium is unique and then globally
determined.
This proposition sheds light on two threshold levels of public spending. If the scal
stimuli are "too small" such that G < Ginf , the economy stays in secular stagnation
(Fig. 6). Even if economic growth is enhanced and unemployment reduced, there remains
some unemployment and additional public spendings are required to leave the secular
stagnation regime. It is the case if G > Gsup. However, we can observe on Fig. 5 that
either the long-run multiplier is higher than the short-term one if the scal stimuli are
not too large, or the reverse if they are too large. Indeed, as exhibited on Figs 7 and 8,
taxation are also associated with a reduction in the incentives to save. There is then a
trade-o¤between the exit of secular stagnation and the accumulation of capital. In Fig. 7
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Figure 5: Impact of scal policy: production and multipliers (short and long run)
taxation is su¢ ciently small so that capital accumulation is promoted compared with the
initial equilibrium with no public spendings. Therefore, after period 0, the capital stock
increases and the scal multiplier exhibits an increased shape. By contrast, if taxation is
too large, incentives to save are lowered so that there is less capital at the full employment
equilibrium compared with the initial secular stagnation equilibrium. The scal multiplier
exhibits a decreasing shape. Note also that if Gsup < G < Ginf , the equilibrium is not
determined. The economy can jump out the secular stagnation to converge towards the
full employment equilibrium (in red on Fig. 5), or stays in.
5 Conclusion
The secular stagnation hypothesis invites to reconsider the traditional macroeconomic
analysis and therefore the design of economic policies. In this article, we have developed
a capital accumulation model that integrates two types of market imperfections which
a¤ect respectively the credit market (rationing) and the labor market (nominal rigidity).
The lessons of this model are many.
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Figure 8: Fiscal policy: Impact of a "too large" stimulus
The emergence of a nominal rate close to zero ("zero lower bound") raises fears of a
loss of e¤ectiveness of "conventional" monetary policy based mainly on the setting of a
o¢ cial interest rate. In a context where the rate of ination and the interest rate of full
employment equilibrium are negative, macroeconomic dynamics can lead to permanent
unemployment trajectories characterizing a regime of secular stagnation.
Then, to avoid ZLB, there is an urgent need to create ination but also to avoid the
"bubbles" on speculative assets (Tirole, 1985). Such a perspective might require special
regulation (Gali, 2014). The existence of a deationary equilibrium calls to question the
merits of monetary policy rules too focused on ination (Benhabib et al., 2001).
The model that we developed also teaches us to beware of deationary e¤ects of growth
of potential output policies. The right policy mix is to support structural policies in a
su¢ ciently accommodative monetary policy.
Reducing the savings to raise the real interest rate (for example, improving access to
credit) is also an interesting idea but the impact on potential GDP is negative. There is a
clear choice between exit the secular stagnation and depress the potential. An interesting
solution is to nance infrastructure policy, education and R & D (increase of A) by
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public borrowing (up Req). Indeed, a strong investment policy (public or private) can
satisfy the twin objectives: supporting the aggregate demand and developing the potential
production.
Regarding the weakening of long-term growth, population aging can let fear a drop
in productivity including obsolescence of human capital (Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Cross et al
2012.). At the same time, the development of the "silver" economy could be a new source
of growth with new needs (Tabata and Hashimoto, 2010) and specic R & D issues. In
the long term, the scarcity of land resources (energy reserves, environmental stress) in the
context of a large global population are also a major concern of the weakening of potential
income.
Two extensions of this model require special attention.
First, it would be useful to introduce an hysteresis e¤ect due to a shock on the produc-
tion or demand. The hysteresis is characterized by the persistence of the consequences
while the causes have disappeared. The cost of time may result in disqualication of
unemployed workers and destruction of unused productive capital. The potential then
naturally weakens. Staying in the crisis is particularly harmful and needs to quickly
close the output gap to avoid the accumulation of negative e¤ects, although paradoxically
negative impact productivity have potentially favorable inationary e¤ects.
Second, this model passes over the international dimension by focusing only on do-
mestic markets. Bernanke (2015) asserts that the opportunity to protable investments
outside national borders reduces the relevance of the secular stagnation hypothesis. Nev-
ertheless, it is undeniable that the opening of borders has profoundly changed the macro-
economic forces. Questioning the perverse e¤ect of globalization in terms of secular stag-
nation remains interesting. The permanent reduction in the overall demand for domestic
goods caused a deindustrialization (signicant drop in potential in some areas), imported
unemployment and a deterioration in the current account implying a massive capital in-
ows in a context of strong currency by comparison with emerging markets and of low
interest rates. Furthermore, the analysis in an open economy invites to question the in-
teractions of monetary policies and in particular their impact on exchange rates. Indeed,
a strong rise in the value of national currency against other currencies has consequences
in terms of imported ination.
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Appendix: Study of the trajectories in the neighbor-
hood of steady states
Case 1. Full employment and satised ination target (i  0, l = 1) :
The equation (19) can be written D
kt+1
= 1+i




t
t+1
. After log-linearization of this
equation and the equation (??), we obtain:
~t+1 = ~t + ~kt (25)
and
~kt+1 = ~kt (26)
where  = Ak
 1+1 
Ak 1 D+G
k
+1  . In matrix form, the local dynamics can be expressed as follows:0@ ~t+1
~kt+1
1A =
0@  
0 
1A0@ ~t
~kt
1A
where 1 =  and 2 =  are the two eigenvalues (det (M) =  = 12 and tr (M) =
 +  = 1 + 2). In the neighborhood of the steady state, we have  < 1 and  > 1,
the full employment steady state with satised ination target is a saddle point.
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Case 2. Full employment with unsatised ination target (i = 0, l = 1) :
In this case, the equation (??) and its linearized form (26) are still valid. By contrast,
we have t+1 =
kt+1
D
and then:
~t+1 = ~kt+1 = ~kt (27)
In this case, the local dynamics is characterized by the following system:
0@ ~t+1
~kt+1
1A =
0@ 0 
0 
1A0@ ~t
~kt
1A
where 1 =  < 1 and 2 = 0 are the two eigenvalues. In this case the dynamics are
undetermined.
Case 3. Secular stagnation equilibrium (i = 0, l < 1) :
We deduce from (??):
~yt = ~kt+1   (1  ) s
1 + n
~kt (28)
where  = 1
1+ s
1+n
D+G
k
  (1 )s
1+n
. Furthermore as yst = Ak

t l
1 
t , we deduce ~yt = ~kt+(1  ) ~lt.
Prot maximization gives (1  ) kt l t = wt and lt =
 
wt
1 
 1
 kt. We nd ~lt =  1 ~wt+
~kt,
and:
~yt = ~kt + (1  )
 1

~wt + ~kt

= ~kt   1  

~wt (29)
Moreover, given the rigidity of nominal wages expressed bywt = wt 1t+(1  ) (1  ) kt ;
the log-linear form can be written as follows ~wt =


( ~wt   ~t) + (1  ) (1  )kw ~kt,
where k

w
=
1  

(1 )(1 ) . We nd:
~wt = ~kt  


1  

~t (30)
By introducing equation (30) in (29), we obtain:
~yt = ~kt +
1  



1  

~t
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From (28), we nd:
~kt+1 =



+
(1  ) s
1 + n

~kt +
1  



1  

~t
Moreover, as t+1 =
kt+1
D
, we have:
~t+1 = ~kt+1,
and we identify the dynamics in its matrix form:
0@ ~t+1
~kt+1
1A =
0@ 1  1    + (1 )s1+n
1 



1  



+ (1 )s
1+n
1A0@ ~t
~kt
1A
det (M) = 0 et tr (M) = 1 



1  

+ 

+ (1 )s
1+n
. If  = 1, then we deduce immediately
that the two associated eigenvalues are 1 = 1 


1  

+ 

and 2 = 0. A necessary and
su¢ cient condition for a saddle-point equilibrium is 1 > 1. This condition is satised i¤:
 < +
1  



1  

This condition is equivalent to the observation in the space (Y;) of a slope of demand 
1


which is greater than that of supply. This condition is always checked when the
stagnation secular equilibrium exists (see Lemma 1).
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